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NOTES
ABORTION:

RIGHT OF MINORS TO ABORTION WITHOUT PARENTAL

CONSENT-State v.

Koome, 84 Wash.2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).

The Supreme Court of Washington recently has shed some light
upon the murky legal area of the constitutional rights of minors. In
State v. Koome,' the Court held that the state could not require an
unmarried pregnant woman under the age of eighteen to obtain her
parents' permission in order to have an abortion. This decision extended the now constitutionally protected right of privacy' with
1. 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975). This issue appears to be headed toward a final
resolution. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a Massachusetts statute, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12P (1974), similar to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.02.070 (1975 Supp.), unconstitutional. That law made it a criminal offense to perform an
abortion upon a minor without the consent of both the minor and her parents but permitting
parental refusal to be overruled by the superior court for good cause shown. An appeal against
this decision was filed in the Supreme Court on July 12, 1975. Bellotti v. Baird, 44 U.S.L.W.
3086(U.S. April 28, 1975). Also before the Court is an appeal from a contrary decision by the
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri which upheld the constitutionality of a
Missouri House Bill, Abortion, H.C.S. House Bill No. 1211, § 3, Mo. ANN. STAT. Appendix
Pamphlet (Vernon 1975), which also closely resembles the Washington law. It requires the
written consent of the minor and also that of a parent or other person acting in loco parentis
before an abortion can be performed. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
44 U.S.L.W. 3220 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1975).
2. This right, which does not appear anywhere in the Constitution, has evolved into one
of the most important sources of protection for the individual against unjustifiable government interference. It was first promulgated by Warren and Brandeis in The Right of Privacy,
4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), with the intention of creating a civil tort action for the invasion
of privacy by private parties, especially newspapers. Primarily as a result of this article,
causes of action were formulated in many states by statute or construction which for a time
flourished. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1948); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App.
285, 297 P. 91 (1931). These actions have since been severely restricted due to the collision
with the first amendment right of freedom of the press in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967), which requires that a plaintiff establish deliberate falsity or recklessness as to truth
in order to recover.
The right of privacy as a constitutional shield has had greater success in recent years.
The Supreme Court has never pinpointed just where the right lies but has inferred it from
various amendments to the Constitution, singly or from two or more in conjunction with each
other. These have included the first, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments; the penumbras of
the Bill of Rights; ahd the concept of liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Only
rights that have been deemed to be "fundamental" by the Court have been given this protection. A wide variety of rights have been found to be "fundamental," but there has been an
especially intense concentration of these in the areas of family, marital and sexual matters.
A list of activities that have been ruled out of bounds for government regulation include:
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967)(marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)(procreation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(use of contraceptives by married
couples); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(use of contraceptives by single persons).
From the latter two cases, it did not require a large conceptual leap to reach the result in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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regard to abortion as set out for adults by the United States Supreme Court to all women, regardless of age, who are capable of
childbirth.'
Prior to 1973, the right of women to have abortions was either
partially or totally curtailed by state law. In that year the United
States Supreme Court rendered obsolete nearly the entire statutory
and case law on the subject in its decisions in Roe v. Wade4 and Doe
v. Bolton.5 The right of adult women to obtain an abortion within
twelve weeks of conception emerged from the legal wreckage while
many new issues were engendered.' One of the questions expressly
not decided was whether this right was, or ought to be, any different
for females under eighteen.
The legislature of Washington answered this in the affirmative
when it revised the state's abortion statute7 in order to conform to
the Supreme Court rulings. The law specifically incorporated the
Court's analysis of permissible state regulation according to the
3. The Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, expressly left open the issue of whether greater
restrictions should be placed upon the exercise of this right by minors. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
at 165 n.67.
4. Id. The Court found the Texas abortion statute unconstitutional as an invasion of
the right of privacy, a right founded upon the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions on state action. It was also held to be violative of the amendment's
due process clause. The Court divided the pregnancy term into approximate thirds and
described the permissible limits of regulation during each period. During the first trimester,
the decision is to be left to the woman and her physician with no state interference allowed
whatever. During the second trimester, the states may make rules for the protection of the
health of the mother, such as fixing the qualifications of practitioners and licensing of facilities. After viability of the fetus, the state may regulate the procedure even to the point of
forbidding abortions unless the health of the mother would be seriously endangered.
5. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In Doe v. Bolton, a companion case decided the same day,
sections of the more modem Georgia abortion statute, based on the American Law Institute
Model, were also held void. These were mainly procedural requirements that were found to
be unduly restrictive of the physician's right to practice medicine based on his independent
judgment. They were also found deficient as they bore no rational relationship to the state's
legitimate interest in protecting the health of the mother.
6. Among the more important issues are: What are the rights of hospitals and their
employees who oppose abortion on moral grounds? What constitutes viability in light of the
medical ability to sustain fetal life outside the mother at progressively earlier stages of
pregnancy? If a woman's right of privacy includes the right to choose to terminate a pregnancy, does she have the right, if she is financially unable, to have this decision implemented
by having the state or federal government pay for it? What rights, if any, does the natural
father have?
7. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.02.060-9.02.090 (1975 Supp.). See also MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 112, § 12P (1974); and Abortion, H.L.S. House Bill No. 1211, § 3, Mo. ANN. STAT.
Appendix Pamphlet (Vernon 1975). Under the present law of Ohio, there are no criminal
sanctions against physicians who perform abortions. However, the Ohio Public Health Council is empowered under OHIO RED. CODE ANN. § 3701.341 (Page 1974), to adopt rules relating
to abortion, violation of which is grounds for disciplinary action by the State Medical Board
under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(G)(Page 1974).
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trimester of pregnancy but then added two caveats. The section in
question' provided in part:
A pregnancy of a woman not quick with child and not more than four
lunar months after conception may be lawfully terminated under
RCW 9.02.070 through 9.02.090 only: (a) with her prior consent and,
if married and residing with her husband or unmarried and under the
age of eighteen years, with the consent of her husband or legal
guardian, respectively ...
Dr. A. Franz Koome was convicted under this statute of performing an abortion on a sixteen-year-old unmarried minor without
her parents' consent. His only defense was that the parental consent
provision was unconstitutional. This was rejected by the trial court;
nevertheless, his conviction was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court which held that a minor's right of privacy regarding
the abortion decision is co-equal with that of adult women?
The court began its analysis by extending to minors the due
process protection established by the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade as applicable to adult women. The Supreme Court had held
that the right to abortion was fundamental and that any state statute which interfered with that right was of necessity inadequately
justified and thus violative of due process. The Washington court
went further and held that such rights were fundamental to minors
in the absence of compelling reasons for state intervention:
Prima facie, the constitutional rights of minors, including the right
of privacy, are coextensive with those of adults. Where minors' rights
have been held subject to curtailment by the state in excess of that
permissible in the case of adults it has been because some peculiar
state interest existed in the regulation and protection of children not
because the rights themselves are of some inferior kind.10
The court rejected an argument by the state that the burden
of the consent provision would be lessened by the statutory power
of intervention on the minor's behalf by the juvenile court. The
expense, publicity and delay of public hearings as well as limits on
8.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

9.02.070 (1975 Supp.)."

9. Dr. Koome was previously found guilty of contempt of court. The minor had petitioned the King County Juvenile Court for an order permitting an abortion. The petition was
opposed by her parents and her temporary guardian, Catholic Children's Social Services, who
had refused consent. The petition was granted but the parents immediately petitioned the
Washington Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and a temporary stay was granted pending
a hearing on this. Despite the stay, the doctor performed the abortion. He was convicted of
contempt and fined $300. In re Koome, 82 Wash. 2d 816, 514 P.2d 520 (1973).
10. State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d at 904, 530 P.2d at 263.
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the juvenile court's jurisdiction to intercede were found to render
this avenue of relief impractical.
The court had conceded that there are still areas of behavior
for which minors could be treated differently from adults; it remained for the court to determine if there was sufficient state interest in this area to treat it as an exception.
The state urged that there were two compelling interests served
by the consent provision: first, to assure an adequately reflective
and informed decision on the part of the minor; second, to support
the family unit and parental authority. Both arguments were rejected.
The court immediately dismissed the idea that the state could
join with parents to coerce a minor into bearing a child:
In the circumstances envisioned by this statute there seems to be
little parental control left for the State to help salvage. An unmarried
minor has become pregnant and her determination to get an abortion
is unalterably opposed by her parents. Reestablishment of parental
control by resort to the pure force of the criminal law seems both
futile and manifestly unwise in such a situation."
The state's interest in the quality of the abortion decision was
held to be insufficient. This is because the statute provided for an
absolute veto power and not for consultation on the subject with the
presumably more knowledgeable parent. The court pointed out that
the facts of this particular case showed that the refusal by the girl's
parents was actually vindictive and against her best interests. It
also noted that there were less drastic means available to insure a
reflective decision, such as consultation with a physician and the
common law requirement that physicians make a subjective inquiry
into a minor's capacity to consent to medical treatment.
The court concluded its discussion of the due process issue by
pointing out that it would be anomalous to hold that a state which
has no power under most circumstances to prohibit abortion can
grant such power to parents to forbid it.
While the court simply could have rested its decision on this
line of reasoning, as the Supreme Court had done in Roe v. Wade,
it chose to go a step further and found that the statute violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the Washington State Constitution."2 This conclusion was based on three dis11. 84 Wash. 2d at 906, 530 P.2d at 265.
12. WASH. CONST. art. I, §12 (1889): "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen,
class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon
the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations."
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criminations made by the statute: "(1) between unmarried adult
women seeking abortions and similarly situated minors; (2) between
married and unmarried minors; and (3) between unmarried minors
seeking abortions, and others seeking other types of medical care."' 3
The first distinction was deemed unjustifiable as it is impossible to establish a fixed statutory age at which a minor becomes
competent to consent to abortion due to differing rates of mental
and emotional maturity. The court recognized that some arbitrary
age limits, such as those provided for voting or obtaining a driver's
license, are permissible due to the impossibility of making subjective determinations of competency on a case by case basis. The
court reasoned that no need for such a fixed limit existed here as
the age of fertility provided a feasible age of consent.
The second distinction was ruled invalid, mainly as there is no
reason to believe that married minors are necessarily more mature
than unmarried ones. Eisenstadt v. Baird,4 which established that
the availability of contraceptives could not be based on marital
status, was cited as the principal authority on the issue.
Finally, the singling out of abortion from all other forms of
medical treatment was found to be unrelated to any legitimate state
concern. Since under Washington law a minor could consent to
other major medical treatment such as sterilization, there was no
reason why she would need any more guidance to decide whether or
not she would undergo an abortion as both procedures are simply
different forms of birth control.
Judge Finley in a concurring opinion, explored possible areas
of constitutionally permissible prohibition of abortion for minors
and found two. These are situations in which a physical ailment
made abortion more dangerous than childbirth, and situations
where there was a greater probability of serious emotional instability resulting to the particular minor from an abortion rather than
from childbirth. Even to do this, there would have to be procedural
safeguards and the burden of proving the existence of either of the
two stated conditions would be on the parent or guardian wishing
to prevent the abortion.
Judge Stafford dissented, emphasizing other situations in
which minors are legally prohibited from exercising rights enjoyed
by adults. It was argued that the state had a compelling interest in
a minor's decision on abortion due to concern for the minor's mental
health and in an informed and objective decision. He considered
13. 84 Wash. 2d at 907, 530 P.2d at 266.
14. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

Published by eCommons, 1976

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:1

access to the juvenile court to seek judicial consent a sufficient
safeguard against arbitrary refusal of consent by parents.
No serious attempt has been made in this decision to provide
an affirmative rationale for expanding minors' rights in the area of
abortion. The court simply could not find any reason why such a
crucial right should be denied to them. The court apparently did not
take the state's arguments too seriously, considering some of its
assertions in response to them. It is questionable that a girl can be
conclusively presumed to be capable of giving meaningful consent
because she is physiologically capable of childbirth. Nor does it
follow that parents automatically lose control over a daughter when
she becomes pregnant. Despite this, the court had adequate reason
for its ruling if for no other reason than the prevailing weight of
authority. The majority opinion cited two federal and two lower
state court decisions to support its position. The dissent could not
find any cases to the contrary. The principal significance of this case
is that it is the first consideration of this issue by a state supreme
court and as such it should be very influential.
While State v. Koome should go a long way toward settling the
abortion question for minors, other issues persist concerning juveniles, mainly regarding their rights within the criminal process and
freedom of expression issues, that will require clarification. State v.
Koome arose primarily as a result of the increased interest in the
area of minors' rights generated by the United States Supreme
5 which
Court decision in the case of In re Gault,"
held that juvenile
court proceedings must meet basic due process requirements although they do not have to provide all of the trappings of a normal
criminal court.'"
The ambiguity that has resulted concerning due process requirements for children is also present in the area of first amendment freedoms. A state can interfere with a minor's practice of his
religion 7 but cannot authorize the recitation of prayer in public
schools even when pupils are not required to participate." A minor
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. Some of these basic requirements include a notice of charges; the right to counsel,
provided by the state if necessary; the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; and the
privilege aginst self-incrimination. Since Gault, other facets of the adult criminal process
have been held to be indispensible to meeting due process requirements, while some have not.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (minor does not have right to trial by jury);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 528 (1970) (minor cannot be convicted of a crime unless his guilt has
been established beyond a reasonable doubt).
17. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
18. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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can be involved in political protest'" but can be prohibited from
2
seeing an X-rated movie. 1
The instances cited above demonstrate an illogical differentiation between the rights and the restrictions of minors. For example,
a minor is considered too immature, under the law, to view pornography while mature enough to decide to terminate a pregnancy.
State v. Koome departs from the pattern of general vagueness in the
area of constitutional rights of minors. Koome takes the issue of
abortion, analyzes the opposing viewpoints, and finds the differentiation between adults and minors irrational. The court's pragmatic
analysis in the area of abortion may have a salutary effect when the
time comes to clear away more of the legal fog that has left minors
in a constitutional twilight zone.
Terry Timblin
19.
20.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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